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Based on a previous study by Amador and Weill (2009), I study the
diffusion of dispersed private information in a large economy subject to a
”catastrophe risk” state. I assume that agents learn from the actions of oth-
ers through two channels: a public channel, that represents learning from
prices, and a bi-dimensional private channel that represents learning from lo-
cal interactions via information concerning the good state and the catastrophe
probability. I show an equilibrium solution based on conditional Bayes rule,
which weakens the usual condition of ”slow learning” as presented in Amador
and Weill and first introduced by Vives (1993). I study asymptotic conver-
gence ”to the truth” deriving that ”catastrophe risk” can lead to ”non-linear”
adjustments that could in principle explain fluctuations of price aggregates.
I finally discuss robustness issues and potential applications of this work to
models of ”reaching consensus”, ”investments under uncertainty”, ”market
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Learning with Catastrophe Risk
1.1 Introduction
Hayek (1945) first argued that markets and organizations can foster the
process of aggregation of information that is owned by its participants. In-
formation aggregation occurs through the public observation of variables that
reflect other agents’ actions (such as prices) or through the private observation
of other agents’ actions (such as rumors or gossips).
The baseline model is an extension of the continuous time world of
Amador and Weill (2009, AW hereafter) and builds on the discrete-time envi-
ronments of Vives (1993, 1997). I consider a continuum of agents who, at time
zero, receive both public and private signals about the state of the world. After
time zero, each agent takes an action at every moment until some random time
when the state of the world is revealed and her payoff is realized. I assume
that an agent’s payoff is independent of the actions of any other agent. After
receiving initial information, but before the state of the world is revealed, each
agent updates her beliefs by observing multi-dimensional noisy signals about
the actions of others. The first signal is public: it is the public learning channel
and could represents an endogenous aggregate variable, such as a price of some
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good or some macroeconomic indicator. The second bi-dimensional signal is
private, only observed by the agent. The way the private signal is structured
provides the main line of departure with respect to the paper of (AW). I will
be show that private signals about a catastrophe state leads to information
dynamics that are interesting in terms of both informational efficiency and
equilibrium characterization.
I solve for an equilibrium in which agents eventually learn the truth.
Like in the herding literature, even in presence of the catastrophe risk, there
is still a public information externality: better public information may reduce
the informational content of both the public and the private channels and
slows down learning. Indeed, with an increase in the accuracy of public infor-
mation, each agent’s action becomes more sensitive to the public information
that is already known by everyone and at the same time, each agent’s action
becomes less sensitive to private information. However the learning dynamics
is complicated by the presence of a catastrophe states that is responsible, in
expectation, for a sort of under-investment problem. It is argued that this
may causes a ”nonlinear” mixing of opinions between the agents. This makes
it harder to glean private information from the noisy observation of agents’
actions, and thus generates ambiguous learning externality: information will
not necessarily diffuse more slowly through all channels. In fact the probabil-
ity of a catastrophe state can mitigates this information externality as agents
can only infer about the state of world through the private signal.
The rest of the Thesis is organized as follows: Section III surveys the
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literature within two main areas that are linked in this proposal: social learn-
ing, and catastrophes. Section IV describes the model, Section V provides
details about the Bayesian Learning , Equilibrium Analysis and Asymptotics,
Section V provides a comparative Welfare analysis, Section VI contains dis-
cussion about possible applications, and direction for future research, Section
VII concludes this work.
1.2 Related Literature
This work is related to the recent literature on the social value of pub-
lic information. Key references in this areas are Morris and Shin (2002) and
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) who provide evidence about the arising of infor-
mation externalities. Hellwig (2005) first studied the implications for monetary
policy. It is common in all this models that agents do not accumulate infor-
mation over time, they do not suffer from our dynamic learning externality
presented in AW. In fact, absent payoff externalities, public information always
improve social welfare of the economy.
I divide the survey of the literature in the two main areas: Social
Learning and Non-Stationary Economies.
1.2.1 Social Learning
The social learning literature, started by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchan-
dani et al. (1992), has pointed out the role information externalities in informa-
tion economics. Their famous result is the possibility of informational cascades
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and herds: agents may choose to disregard their private information, acting
solely on the basis of the public information, and take the “wrong” action
with catastrophic consequences. Thus it is implicit in their framework that
public information, by facilitating the emergence of herds, can reduce welfare.
However, the standard herding models are sequential move games, and the
appearance of cascades and herds requires technical conditions rarely met in
practice. The model presented in this thesis is an extension of (AW) (2009)
similar also to the seminal works of Vives (1993 and 1997), where beliefs are
unbounded and actions lie in a continuous space. Vives (1993) showed that
when agents learn noisy public information from others, then they learn the
truth at a slow speed of t1/3 (where t is the number of periods of market inter-
actions). The slow convergence result is due to the informational externality
explained above. The more informative the public signal is, as more periods
accumulate, the less privately informed agents rely on their private signals, so
that less information gets incorporated into the public signal, slowing down
convergence. In their recent work, (AW) show that when agents also learn
noisy private information from others, then the rate of convergence is t, how-
ever in the short term a log (t) convergence rate determines the behavior of
temporary shocks.
This work is also partially related to recent studies in the area of social
learning in networks. Important references are Bala and Goyal (1998), Gale
and Kariv (2003), and Smith and Sørensen (2005) Banerjee and Fudenberg
(2004) and DeMarzo et al. (2003). The private learning channel of the present
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work, as in (AW) can be thought as reduced form model of local interactions
through networks as the setup presented here, although somewhat simpler can
be thought as the result of random local interactions.
1.2.2 Non-Stationary Economy and Catastrophes
The main innovation provided by this paper is the inclusion of a catas-
trophe state. Lately, there has been a revival of the intuition of Rietz (1988)
that the simple possibility of rare disasters, such as economic depressions or
wars, is a major determinant of equilibrium prices. Indeed, Barro (2006) has
shown that, internationally, disasters have been sufficiently frequent and large
to make Rietz’s proposal viable and account for the high risk premium on
traded assets. An alternative line of empirical research has focuses on the so
called ”Peso Problem” as see Bekaert et al. (1997): investors anticipating the
possibility of a catastrophe, which cannot be measured or learned ex ante,
discount strongly future returns in a way that is not dynamically consistent
with a classical intertemporal equilibrium modes. The work presented here
maintains the basic feature of both the Rietz and Bekaert approach.
Perhaps, the only attempt similar to the one presented in this thesis
is the one by Moscarini, Ottaviani and Smith (1998). They present a the so-
cial learning model, in a discrete state space setting, following the directions
of Banerjee et al. (1992) in which individuals take actions sequentially after
observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative
private signal. It is shown that if the state of the world is stochastic, only tem-
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porary informational cascades, situations where socially valuable information
is wasted can arise. Furthermore, no cascade ever arises when the environ-
ment changes in a sufficiently unpredictable way. With the simple belief of
the presence of a bad state could act as stabilizer in the sense of making the
individuals realize about the informational cascade.
1.3 Model Setup
Time is continuous and runs forever. The economy is populated by a
[0, 1]-continuum of agents whose payoff depend on some unknown and stochas-
tic state of the world θ ·x ∈ R+, with θ = {0, 1}. This means the economy can
be in two states depending on the latent variable θ = {0, 1}. The state θ = 0
is called the catastrophe state, while θ = 1 the good state. Note that we have
two disjoint stochastic processes: the value of the economy in the good state
x, and the chance of being in a catastrophe state determined by θ.
At each time before some exponentially1 distributed “Armageddon time”
τ > 0, with parameter λ, each agent takes an action ait ∈ R. At time τ , the




(ait − θ · x)2 dt (1.1)
This means that in expectation, at each instant t, by denoting the true prob-
1The choice of the exponential distribution implies a constant hazard rate λ, that cannot
be inferred by the agents.
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ability of {0, 1} as 1− π and π the first best is to play
at = E (θ · x) = πθ (1.2)
In a market setting this could be interpreted as hedging or under-
investment problem due to the risk of a catastrophe similar to the ”Peso Prob-
lem” detailed above. This model, albeit of simple specification, contains two
important feature:
• The agents do not have time preferences; at each point in time they
have to provide the best possible guess. This is driven by the quadratic
utility assumption and the fact that the end of world might happen at
each instant;
• The agents learn about the state of world at each instant using Bayes
rule. Bayes rule in the setup has been shown to be optimal (see Vives,
1993).
1.3.1 Information Structure
Agents are endowed with a diffused common prior over x that is nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and zero precision, and a common prior p
over the catastrophe state. (Without loss of generality we can assume p = 1
2
).
At each point in time they observe:
• a public signal Zt centered around the average action in the economy.
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• a private signal zit concerning the conditional value of x given θ = 1;
• a second private signal concerning the distribution of θ, denoted by εit
as described above.









πi0(θ) = 1/2 (1.5)
where W0, (ωi0) with i ∈ [0, 1] are normally distributed with mean zero and
variance one, pairwise independent, and independent of everything else. In
equation 1.3, P0, p0,S0 represent the respective precisions of the public and
the private signals.
The initial signal Z0 represents information released by a public agency.
The continuum of initial private signals, (zi0, πit(θ))i∈[0,1], make agents asym-
metrically informed about θ · x, and represents dispersed information about
aggregate economic conditions.
At all times after time zero the public and the private signal evolve









dεit = θdt+ dBit (1.8)
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where Wt, wit, Bit are independent realizations or of simple Brownian mo-
tions. The private learning channels capture the decentralized gathering of
information. One could think, for instance, of local interaction and of private
communication, such as gossips.
1.3.2 Filtrations
Given the multiplicity of signals, it is convenient to define more formally
the information structure considering the following filtrations:
• Ht : the filtration derived by observing the public signal Zt up to time
t.
• Iit : the filtration derived by observing the private signal zit by individual
i up to time t.
• Lit : the filtration derived by observing the private signal zit by individual
i up to time t.
• Mit : the joint filtration Iit∨ Lit by combining the information from both
the private signals for individual i at time t.
• Git: the joint filtration of Ht ∨ Mit by combining all the information
available for individual i at time t.
Each filtration is regular according to the standard conditions presented
in Oksendal (1995, Ch. 1).
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1.3.3 The Agents’ Problem
As agents are infinitesimal, their actions do not affect the average action
process A, and hence do not affect the information they receive. By combining
this with their preferences in (1.1), the agents’ intertemporal problem is essen-
tially static, and together with their quadratic payoffs, it implies that optimal
actions are the expectation
ait = E [x · θ|Git] (1.9)
of the random variable x, conditional on their information filtration {Git, t ≥ 0}.





We summarize all the above in the following
An Equilibrium is a collection of
• a stochastic processes ai for each agent solving the prediction problem
in (1.9),
• a stochastic process At determining the average action in (1.10),
• information dynamics given by (1.6).
1.3.4 Timing
The timing of the model can be described as follows:
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• Time 0: Nature draws x, θ, and τ .
• Time t > 0 with t < τ Agents receive private and public signals, and
play action ait = E [x · θ|Git] by predicting x ·θ given all the information
they have available. Agents are Bayesian in the way of both predicting
the states for each signal, and combining them into a single action.
• Time τ . x · θ is revealed, payoffs are settled and the game ends.
1.4 Equilibrium: Dynamics, Analysis and Asymptotics
In this section I first detail the continuous time Bayesian learning rules
as I tried to present them and then solve for the equilibrium given the notions
presented in (AW, 2009).
1.4.1 The Learning problem for the Private Signal zit Public signal
Zt
The dynamics of the private belief about x and public belief on the
combined x · θ can be determined with a direct application of one-dimensional
continuous-time Kalman filtering formula (see Oksendal, 1995, pages 85-105).
Take for example the private signal zit which provides information
about the value of x. In state-space formulation, the filtering problem for
the signal zit is equivalent to the noisy observation of a constant process rep-
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resented as follows:
(system) dxt = 0 (x is constant in time)
(observations) dzit = xtdt+
dwit√
pε




. The agent produced a series a predictions






, t ≥ 0
This gives the following equation for the prediction of x for the indi-




































so we have a standard conjugate Bayes rule2 that tell us to average the
prediction between the historical average and the new signal zit with weights
2Normal Prior and Normal Likelihood gives rise to a Normal distributed Predictive dis-
tribution, given that m is known.
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proportional to the sum of the precisions. This implies that at instant t in-
dividual i, believes that the predictive distribution for zit to be Normal with
mean x̂it and precision m
2 + p2t.
Following the same directions by defining M = 1√
Pε
, and P = 1√
P0
, the





1.4.2 Bayesian Learning for the Markov Process θ(t)
Let θ = θ(t) be a random variable taking either 0 or 1 value and without
loss of generality assume prior information π(0) = 1/2. The random process
εt, t ≥ 0, with
(system) θ = θ(t) ∼Markov (0, 1) (1.11)
(observations) dεt = θdt+ σdBt (1.12)
ε0 = 0 (1.13)
is observed. Then the a posteriori probability π(t) = P (θ = 1|Lt) according
to Lipster and Shyrayev (Ch. 9, Theorem 9.6) satisfies the following equation
dπ(t) = π(t) (1− π(t)) [dεt − π(t)dt] (1.14)
π(0) = 1/2. (1.15)
The density of the Radon-Nykodym derivative µ1, corresponding to the process






then from Bayes formula it follows that
π(t) = φ(t) /(1 + φ(t)) . (1.17)
In the case under consideration this ”likelihood functional” (Lipster and Shyrayev
Theorem 7.7) is defined by φ(t) = exp (εt − t/2) which is a geometric Brownian
motion, and therefore,
dφ(t) = φ(t)dεt (1.18)
= φ(t)θdt+ φ(t)σdBt (1.19)
It will be noted that the a posteriori probability π (t) (or φ (t)) is a
sufficient statistics in the problem of testing two simple hypotheses:
H0 : θ = 0, H1 : θ = 1


















which does not have closed form solution, but it is easy to verify that for t = 0,
π (1) = 1/2 as expected, while for t→∞ by an application of the central limit





where θTrue is the either zero or one depending on Nature draw.
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where B̄t is the so-called innovation process of filtering theory, see Lipster and
Shyrayev (theorem 7.12). In other words the change in beflies dπt is normally




. This result about the second
moment will prove useful in deriving the equilibrium in the next Section.
1.4.3 Equilibrium Characterization: Closed Form Solution
I now show that there exists an equilibrium in which agent i’s action at
any time is the conditionally convex combination of two forecasts of weighted
states of the world: a public forecast shared with everyone in the economy,
which we denote by X̂t, and a private forecast, denoted by x̂it defined earlier,
containing all the information observed by agent i and no one else. As men-
tioned earlier, Bayesian updating implies that the action taken by agent i at
time t is, then,
ait = E [x · θ|Git]
The public forecast, is, of course the same for every agent. On the other
hand the agents have to combine the two private signals. Here we adopt a
Normal approximation in order to be able to deal with signals with the same
distributional properties.
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1.4.3.1 Combining Private Signals with a First Order Approxima-
tion
The first two moments are easily characterized:
E [x · θ|Mit] = πitx̂it































(σ + 1) π2it + π
4
it − 2π3it + (σ + 1) π2itpitx̂2it + pitx̂2it (π4it − 2π3it)− pitσπ2itx̂2it
pitσ
=

























Also, I am dropping every squared and interaction term. The eco-
nomic reasoning behind this approximation can be summarized in the following
points:
• Model Consistency: Agents have quadratic utility, which implies just
the first two moments of signals are entering the utility computation.
At the same time a Normal distribution is fully characterized by the
first two moments which in turns is consistent with both the preferences
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and the filtering rules presented earlier. Including higher order terms,
such as skewness and kurtosis components, albeit important from the
empirical point of view, would contradict the internal structure of the
model presented here.
• No ”Scale Effects”: in the model here scale effects are not supposed
to play a role. This means that the squared level x̂2it should not be
important; as a partial justification it is always possible to normalize
x to be in the neighborhood of 1, in this case x can be thought as a
log-growth rate.
• This procedure of linearization is consistent with modern macroeco-
nomics and asset pricing theory and practice where models are usually
”log-linearized” and econometric techniques such as the Delta Method
and Lagrange Approximation for the Posterior distribution.








1.4.3.2 Combining the Derived Private Signal with the Public One:
Determination of the Equilibrium
We know that the forecasts are normally distributed, independent given
x · θ and that the public forecast is common knowledge. Following standard
Bayesian Decision Theory (Berger, 1985 Ch.2), the action taken by individual
17
i at time t, is given by







which a precision weighted combination of the public and the private forecasts.
Note that the private forecasts are unbiased and based on independent private
evaluations: thus their cross section must be equal to the true x · θ. This














x̂itdt represent the average prediction of the agents as well as
πt (θ). This means that if we are interested in determining the global behavior
agents across time, we can aggregate by averaging, and considering the predic-
tions from the ”mean” agent the i subscripts. This is the reason why I drop
all the i−subscripts.
1.4.4 Qualitative Analysis of the Equilibrium
Before entering into the asymptotic considerations in the following sec-
tion, I here provide some qualitative comparisons with respect to the results
obtained in (AW).
The presence of the catastrophe states scales down the information
percolated through the public channel by decreasing the precision of the public
signal. This means that agents will pay proportionally more attention to
their private forecast, and it is easy to anticipate that, at least in presence of
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short term shock, the ”slow learning” phenomenon described in Vives will be
relatively weaker. Also the higher the variance σ, the lower the precision that
can be derived from the market. Furthermore the rescaled public and private
are informationally equivalent.
Following considerations in (AW), the precisions of the adjusted public
and private forecasts, Pt and pt, are readily characterized by a coupled system













πt(θ) = φ(t) /(1 + φ(t)) (1.22)
dφ(t) = φ(t)θdt+ φ(t)σdBt (1.23)
Where Pε and pε are constants induced by the common knowledge assumption
and the initialization. The stochasticity is induced by the presence of the θ
process which determines pπt .
1.4.5 Learning Asymptotics and Derivation of Slow learning Prop-
erties
The literature on ”slow learning” is concerned with the behavior of the
private signals. In particular, as explained in Section II, it is argued that due
to information externalities the agents tend to pay less attention to the private
signal than the public one.
Following the system in (1.20), we have a stochasticity induced by the
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presence of the θ process which determines pπt . Note that the the first ODE
can be transformed into the second by pre-multiplying by the ratio of the






This result suggests the form for the following Claim.
beginclaim (Precision Asymptotics). (i) The precision of the private












, and (iii) as t→
∞ the total precision, grows with rate
π2it (σ + 1)
σ

























Proof. Consider Appendix A in (AW) with the modified system of ODEs.
This means that the precision of the beliefs is growing at a linear rate
when pε > 0, even though no new information is being exogenously provided
to the agents: that is the social learning generated from endogenous private
signals, no matter how noisy, and no matter how bad the catastrophe state is
perceived, is sufficient to restore the speed of convergence to the linear rate.
From the analysis above the growth rate of the sum of the precisions
























where (A) grows linearly and so is responsible for the long-term behav-
ior of the learning process while (B) dominates the short term behavior.
As (A) dominates in the long term, it also determines the ”slow learning
property” of agents ending up paying too much attention to the private signal
In contrast (B) determines the response to precision shocks in the short term.
Also in (A), any temporary shocks not affecting directly the pε/ (pε + π
2Pε)
ratio will not change the long term behavior. This means that volatility shocks
such as changes in σ or in the initial conditions p0, P0 will only have a tempo-
rary effect due to the (B), slowing down the learning in a way that is actually
diverse with respect to the (AW) case. In fact in their paper the (B) part is




1.5 Comparative Welfare Analysis of the Catastrophe
Risk
In this last section I draw a comparison with the Welfare analysis de-
rived in (AW). While derivations could follow the same directions of their
paper, I concentrate on explaining the differences with their findings. Let the
welfare criterion by the equally weighted sum of agents’ expected utility. By














where the welfare intensity is normalized and the result is obtained by using
the independence between the random exponential time and the fact that
E
[
(ait − x)2 |Git
]
= 1/ (Pt + p
π
t ).
Hence, I have shown that the aim of a representative agent, which
could be thought as the market organizer, is to maximize at each point in
time the total precision of the average agent. Thus, this is connected with the
characterization of the asymptotic properties derived in the previous Section.
(AW) claim for all initialization p0, P0, there is a time time ν > 0, and ν < τ ,
such that for t < ν, ∂W
∂Pt
< 0. This means a positive Public Precision shock
can actually decrease welfare in the short term. This notion is weakened in
the setup presented here as Pt is discounted by
π2it(σ+1)
σ
, so if the time is short
the ∂W
∂Pt
depends on the stochasticity of πt that could in principle change the
behavior of the derivative. An increase of public precision acts non-linearly
on the aggregate action as I have pointed out earlier while discussing the
equilibrium rule.
(AW) analyze the dynamic learning externality by studying the optimal
social diffusion of information. A planner chooses an adapted action ai in order
to maximize the ex-ante utility of a randomly chosen agent, subject to learning.
In setting up this problem, I follow Vives (1997) and consider actions that are
22
convex combinations of the public and the private forecasts:
ait = (1− γt) X̂t + γtπit (θ) x̂it
with 0 < γ < 1. It is evident that if I set γ =
pπt
Pt+pπt
, I am back to the original




and γ. This means that as expected, slow learning is not
optimal, and agents should pay more attention to their private forecast with
respect of what is implied by Bayes Rule. The main difference with respect
to their result is that under catastrophe risk, the social planner has different
ways to implement the rule:
• Telling agents the optimal weight directly γ∗t which would determine the
end of a competitive market as agents act ”optimally” by Bayes rule.
• decreasing the accuracy of the public signal. so to cause some market
shock. This cannot be thought as a practical option as the public sig-
nal is common knowledge, so the agent would realize the manipulation
instantaneously leading to higher order expectation effects that are not
considered in this model.
• spreading rumors about catastrophe probability so to cause shocks on
πt; This is actually more effective at t grows and also practical as it
might sufficient to spread some rumors to a portion of the agents via the
private channel, to modify the average πt.
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The last two points are usually considered to be bad features of markets,
while in fact they can improve the information processing of the agents.
1.6 Discussion: Economic Predictions and Themes for
Future Research
I conclude this work by suggesting some potential applications as well
as economic predictions and motivations for further research. In fact even if
the model presented here is quite simple, it can be adapted to work in different
area of economics and finance:
• Reaching Consensus: The problem of reaching consensus starting from
disparate expectations has been at the center of economics of informa-
tion since the seminal paper of Aumann (1976). It has been shown
that repeated public announcements of a stochastically monotone aggre-
gate statistics of conditional expectations, which need not to be common
knowledge, leads to consensus (McKelvey and Page (1986) and Nielsen
et al (1990)). In the iterative process, individuals compute conditional
expectations with the information they have available and the aggregate
statistics is announced. Individuals then compute their expectations on
the basis of their private information plus the new public information,
and the process continues. In the basic model of (AW) repeated public
announcement of a linear noisy functions of agents conditional expecta-
tions leads to consensus but slowly, due to the ”slow learning” property
first studies by Vives. We could argue that rephrasing Geanakoplos and
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Polemarchakis (1982), that in presence of noisy public information ”we
cannot agree forever but can disagree for a long time”. The results pre-
sented in the ”slow learning” part show that in periods of time when
people think there is an high chance of a catastrophe state, convergence
to the truth can be made faster. Also the section on the Welfare Analy-
sis tells us that one way to break ”ties” or periods of disagreement is to
start spreading rumors about catastrophes between the agents.
• Macroeconomic Forecasting and Investments: It is possible to con-
sider competitive firms, producing forecasts, in presence of some macroe-
conomic uncertainty. The decisions could be either financial (acquire a
new company, extend a bank loan, issuing new securities etc.) or opera-
tional (acquiring new technology, investing in research etc.). Macroeco-
nomic uncertainty can be summarized in the parameter x, however there
is a chance π (θ) that the economy will collapse. Firms invest taking into
account that the profits of their accumulated investment depend on the
realization of θ ·x. Thus the investment decision is directly linked to the
prediction of θ ·x. To predict θ ·x each firm has access to private signals,
produced by a privately hired macroeconomists, as well as public in-
formation, aggregate past investment figures compiled by a government
agency. Data on aggregate corporate investment includes measurement
error. Consequently at each period the noise aggregate is made public.
The research question in this setup, that can be adapted very easily to
the one presented in the paper, is whether repeated announcement of
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the aggregate investment figures reveal the state of world, and if so how
fast. The take from this study is that reducing the measurement error,
for instance by adopting more strict accounting standards, may not nec-
essarily need to an improvement in the investment decisions at least in
the short run.
• The Design and Efficiency of ”Prediction Markets”: These are
speculative markets created for the purpose of making predictions, mean-
ing there is not necessarily an underlying tradable asset The current
market prices can then be interpreted as predictions of the probability
of the event or the expected value of the parameter θ ·x, which is normal-
ized between 0 and 1. Some academic research has focused on potential
flaws with the prediction market concept. In particular, Manski (2005)
first attempted to show mathematically that under a wide range of as-
sumptions the ”predictions” of such markets do not closely correspond
to the actual probability beliefs of the market participants unless the
market probability is near its boundaries. Manski (2005) suggests that
directly asking a group of participants to estimate probabilities may lead
to better results. However, Gjerstad (2005) shows that prediction mar-
ket prices are very close to the mean belief of market participants if the
agents are risk averse and the distribution of beliefs is spread out (as
with a normal distribution, for example). At the empirical level Wolfers
and Zitzewitz (2006) have obtained similar results, and also include some
analysis of prediction market data. The outcome from my research can
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be reconciled with this framework. In fact as the price is based in the
π-space, using the logit transformation presented in (1.17) can be recast
in the x ·θ state of the private signals. The structure of the updating can
be thought as the same as well as some economic predictions that should
not be affected by a logit transformation which is monotone. With re-
spect the ”slow learning” and ”catastrophe risk” state could play a role
in determining the efficiency of information aggregation in prediction
markets. In light of the results in this research, I tend to agree with
Manski. A public signal of 1/2 implies perfect uncertainty and in this
could be a result of both slow learning and catastrophe shocks. This
certainly requires further investigation.
• Market Efficiency and Asset Pricing Methods: the cornerstone
of modern financial economics is market efficiency which in one of its
forms prescribes that all information should be accounted into prices.
The model presented here seems to be consistent with the definition of
market efficiency but it also introduces features of ”convergence to the
truth” that can explain other behavioral theories assumed to invalidate
it, such as informational cascades. However modern asset pricing, rarely
allow for learning and rarely offers non-representative agents theories. It
would be certainly interesting to embed this work into a more general
market microstructural model.
• The Role of ”Dr. Doom” in Markets: Nouriel Roubini is a famous
economist that earns his nickname as ”Dr. Doom” for repeated and con-
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troversial claims about incoming catastrophes. As an example in 2008,
Fortune magazine wrote, ”In 2005 Roubini said home prices were riding
a speculative wave that would soon sink the economy. Back then the
professor was called a Cassandra. Now he’s a sage”. From my point of
view, ”Dr. Doom” could actually has a positive role as he is acting as
it was suggested in the Welfare Analysis Section. Repeated catastrophe
shocks can improve information processing of agents avoiding slow learn-
ing which could determine herding behavior and market crashes. Thus
by calling for a crash he is actually working in the other direction. From
a research perspective it would be interested to extend the framework
presented here to the case of ”public” catastrophe rumors. I believe the
structure should not change significantly.
1.7 Conclusion
I have presented a model of learning from others’ actions with the
possibility of a catastrophe state. My work extends the analytically tractable
framework of Amador and Weill (2009) by including sources of uncertainty
that can possible restore informational efficiency. In particular I have shown
that catastrophe risk shocks could act as natural economic stabilizer by having
individuals paying more attention to their private information. In such a way,
excessive reliance on public source, and appearance of informational cascades
and herding could be avoided. I have finally discussed potential applications
and extensions for future research.
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